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5 Biko on non-white and black
. Improving social reality 
Brian Epstein 
Bantu Steve Biko begins his article "The Definition of Black Consciousness," 
written in 1971 for the leadership of the South African Students' Organisation 
(SASO), with the following definition and explanation of the category black: 
We have in our policy manifesto defined blacks as those who are by law 
or tradition politically, economically and socially discriminated against as a 
group in the South African society and identifying themselves as a unit in the 
struggle towards the realisation of their aspirations. 
This definition illustrates to us a number of things: 
Being black is not a matter of pigmentation-being black is a reflection 
of a mental attitude. 
2 Merely by describing yourself as black you have started on a road to 
emancipation ... 
If one's aspiration is whiteness but his pigmentation makes attainment of 
this impossible, then that person is a non-white. Any man who calls a white 
man 'Baas', any man who serves in the police force or Security Branch is 
ipso facto a non-white. Black people-real black people-are those who can 
manage to hold their heads high in defiance rather than willingly surrender 
their souls to the white man. 1 
This definition-a statement at the core of Black Consciousness philosophy-is 
at once compelling, provocative, and puzzling. Biko is clearly doing more than 
defining a word: he is criticizing a category, introducing another, and issuing a 
call to action. My aim in this chapter is to interpret and develop the intellectual 
move that Biko is making here and in related writings. In particular, I argue that 
Biko is engaged in a project that is beginning to attract substantial attention in the 
analytic literature: the project of the "amelioration" of social concepts and catego­
ries. Biko himself-it has been persuasively argued by Mabogo More and Lewis 
Gordon2-writes in the tradition of existential phenomenology. More and Gordon 
explore Biko's continuity with Frantz Fanon, and in this chapter I draw exten­
sively on their interpretations, attempting to complement and elaborate on these 
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continuities. I also, however, attempt to show how Biko moves beyond Fanon in 
crucial ways, solving problems that Fanon confronted. This chapter also draws 
on George Hull's recent work on Black Consciousness as addressing problems 
of "hermeneutical injustice."3 As opposed to the conceptual and epistemological 
implications of Biko's work, however, I focus on examining its connections with 
social metaphysics. Biko, I argue, aims to show how we can transform an existing 
set of oppressive sociai categories in the world into new social categories. 
Biko's definitions of non-white and black 
Biko wrote "The Definition of Black Consciousness" near the midpoint of the 
apartheid era-twenty or so years after the electoral victory of the National Party 
and the establishment of apartheid, and twenty years before it began to unravel. He 
was writing in a context in which racial categories were, of course, central to the 
concerns of the government. The National Party government made ongoing efforts 
to define and institutionalize race; however, the apartheid categories not only 
pre-dated the apartheid system but largely persist today, having been reified over 
three-and-a-half centuries into identities, family relationships, culture, religion, and 
geographic divisions. The current census classifies South Africans into five catego­
ries: Black African, Coloured, Indian or Asian, White, and Other. "Coloured" is a 
specifically South African category, applying largely to the descendants of popu­
lations from the Cape Colony, populations which included slaves brought from 
Malaysia, Indonesia, India, and Madagascar; Khoi and San indigenous people; and 
Dutch and English colonizers. As with other racial categories in South Africa, the 
grouping was materially, culturally, and socially reinforced through differential 
treatment and forced migration. Apartheid policies were often applied across a mix 
of racial and ethnic lines. In 1959, for instance, the apartheid government outlawed 
the registration of non-white students at formerly open universities, and created 
segregated "University Colleges"-separate colleges for Zulu students, for Sotho­
Tswana students, for students who spoke Xhosa, for "Coloured" students, and for 
Indian students.4 Still there was little ambiguity for the architects of apartheid about 
which lines were ethnic and which racial: the Zulu/Sotho/Tswana/Xhosa lines 
were ethnic or linguistic divisions within the racial category they called "native" 
or "Bantu," and the other groups were distinct races. The apartheid Population 
Registration Act of 1950 explicitly defined the three largest of the "races": 
A White person is one who is in appearance obviously white-and not gener­
ally accepted as Coloured-or who is generally accepted as White-and is 
not obviously a Non-White, provided that a person shall not be classified as 
a White person if one of his natural parents has been classified as a Coloured 
person or a Bantu 
A Bantu is a person who is, or is generally accepted as, a member of any 
aboriginal race or tribe of Africa ... 
A Coloured is a person who is not a White person or a Bantu .... 
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Even to the authors of this law, it was apparent that these definitions are peculiar 
and of questionable coherence, as the criteria were changed in six subsequent 
revisions of the Act. As they stand, these definitions mix a variety of criteria, 
including appearance, descent, previous classifications, and what is "gener­
ally accepted." Yet despite this mix, the architects of apartheid regarded racial 
categories as fundamentally biological. 5 The complexity of the definitions was 
understood largely as being a consequence of the government wanting them 
(along with the racial tests also specified in the Act) to serve as practical guides 
for assessment and classification, to be implemented by the Race Classification 
Review Boards.6 
An important feature of Biko's definitions, therefore, is that his categories are 
clearly political and social. Today, most theorists agree with Biko that racialized 
categories are complex social constructions, but this was not widely held in South 
Africa at the time. In this way, the Black Consciousness theorists broke not only 
with the apartheid architects' treatment of race, but also with prevailing opposi­
tion views, especially those of "Africanist" thinkers. 
This aspect of Biko's approach is now close to conventional wisdom. However, 
other features of Biko's definitions remain striking and counterintuitive even to a 
contemporary eye. First, Biko defines black extraordinarily broadly: it cuts across 
any standard understanding of racial difference, even when it is understood as 
socially constructed. Black is much more inclusive than an ordinarily understood 
racial category, including not only people whom the apartheid government would 
categorize as "natives," but also at least people whom the government would cat­
egorize as "Coloured" and "Asiatic." 
Second, Biko's definitions are explicitly localized to South Africa. The con­
tingencies of South African law, the traditions and practices of separation and 
oppression, and the political structures that reinforce apartheid are the basis of 
his categories. In elevating the category black, he follows Africanist movements 
that reject a kind of post-racial universalism or humanism. But in defining the 
category as fixed to the local context, he even more starkly departs from their 
categorizations, which in contrast to Biko's are designed to unify people across 
the African continent and the African diaspora. 
Third and most conspicuous is Biko's psychological criterion that marks the 
difference between black and non-white. A person fits the category black only if 
that person identifies with a unit that is involved in the struggle against oppres­
sion. This, for Biko, is a matter of mental attitudes. 
How, then, does Biko define white, non-white, and black? At first blush, the 
passage seems to give a simple analysis: 
1 (White) Those who are not discriminated against by law or tradition 
2 (Non-white) Those discriminated against by law or tradition, and having the 
attitude of aspiring to whiteness 
3 (Black) Those discriminated against by law or tradition, and having the atti­
tude of defiance. 
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Bik�, it seems, m�rks out three mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive cat­
e�on_es _of people _m South Africa. The non-whites and blacks are those who arediscnmmated agamst by law and tradition, and they are distinguished from one another by their mental attitudes. 
This simple reading, however, does not withstand scrutiny. Biko's definitions?f blac� and no_n-white seem parallei to one another, but the two make interest­mgly different mtellectual moves. One indication of this is the vast difference bet�een h?w the words "non-white" and "black" were respectively used in SouthAfrica_ dunng the early apartheid era. Prior to the work of Biko and other BlackCo�sc10usness theorists, the term "black" had largely been absent from the SouthAfrican �ontext. 7 The t�� "n?n-white," on the other hand, was ubiquitous. 8 Manyapartheid laws and pohc1es did draw on finer distinctions, with differential treat­ment accorded to a variety ofracial subcategories. But the physical signage in the country, for the most part, was marked "white" and "non-white," or equivalently(for the �partheid �uthorities) "European" and "non-European." These were thelabels pamted on signs, walls, and walkways restricting access to trains, busi­nesses, bathrooms, government offices, queues, beaches, park benches, and more.
. In the aP_artheid context, the distinction between white and non-white is exhaus­
�1ve, �o:venng the entire population. It is conceivable that Biko, in his definition,is sphttmg the category non-white in two : he retains the term "non-white" to refer to people formerly known as non-white and who have the additional characteristicthat they have such-and-such an attitude, and he introduces a new term, "black,"fo� peop!e formerly known as non-white but who have a contrasting attitude. But
�his, I will ar�e, is a misinterpretation. In introducing the category black, Biko1s �ot so much mtroducing a third category as he is transforming one inter-related
�air of categories into another pair. He is perfonning what we might call an "rune­horative project,"9 criticizing and replacing a problematic social construct. The psychological differences between non-white and black are relevant to this trans­formation, but I will argue that they are not the only-or even the crucial-dif­ference bet�een these two categories. They are as much the product of Biko'stransformation as they are the source of it. 
Non-white in the context of Fanon
Understanding the ameliorative moves Biko is making with his definition ofblack, then, depends on clarifying his treatment of non-white. I follow More 2008, 2014 and Gordon 2008 in their claims that Biko 's treatment of non-whiteis signifi�ant�y influe�ced by Fanon and should be understood as a development
ofFanon s views. I will suggest, however-drawing in part on a paradox raisedby Gord�n-that_ Biko develops his categories somewhat differently than Fanondoes. Domg so gives Biko the tools to accomplish tasks that are not available toFanon : _he avoids the paradoxes that trouble Fanon's claims, and more impor­tantly, 1s able to make an ameliorative transfonnation-i.e., the transformationfrom non-white to black-that Fanon could not. In Biko's innovations we cansee a number of ways in which the amelioration of categories can o;cur, and
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in which the construction and re-construction of social categories interact with 
political 'aims. 
A note about terminology: Fanon, writing in the 1950s in France and Algena 
and trained by Aime Cesaire and other Negritude thinkers, describes and analyzes 
"noir" and "negre," both of which are obviously different from Biko's "black." 
Fanon's term "blanc" is also somewhat different from Biko's "white," given 
Biko's emphasis on the local specificity of the category, but here the ambiguity is 
not as problematic. To keep the categorizations discussed by Fanon distinct from 
those of Biko , I will follow Gordon 2015 in using the terms "white" and "negre"
when discussing Fanon. 
Fanon diagnoses these categories as having a kind of built-in negation or oppo­
sition: part of the nature of negre is to be negative, and to be in opposition to 
white. Fanon argues that the racist distinction between white and negre cannot be 
understood as simply a division of humanity into groups. He builds on Hegel's 
claim that human consciousness, both of oneself and of other people, is built on 
the mutual recognition of one another as human. There is no consciousness­
no self-without mutual recognition. Fanon approvingly quotes Hegel: "Self­
consciousness exists in itself and for itself, in that and by the fact that it exists 
for another self-consciousness: that is to say, it is only by being acknowledged or 
recognized."10 Mutual recognition is the basis for self-consciousness, and hence 
for humanity. 
But while Fanon agrees on the centrality of recognition for humanity, he 
denies that the encounter of white and negre is one of mutual recognition. At 
the time Fanon wrote Black Skin, White Masks, the dialectic of master and 
slave was regarded by Francophone philosophers as the centerpiece of Hegel's 
Phenomenology. 11 But Fanon observes that the relation between white and negre,
or between colonial master and colonized, bears little resemblance to the complex 
interplay of conflict, independence, and recognition that Hegel develops. "For 
Hegel," writes Fanon, "there is reciprocity; here the master scorns the conscious­
ness of the slave. What he wants from the slave is not recognition but work."12 For 
a person to be in the category negre is precisely to be unrecognized. It is to have 
one's humanity withheld. 
This failure of recognition manifests itself in the ordinary experience of daily 
living. Among the most potent illustrations Fanon gives is not the encounter 
of a slave with a colonial master, or an encounter with a virulent racist, but an 
encounter with a "well-meaning liberal." A brief vignette in Black Skin, White
Masks recounts a moment of typical daily experience. As Fanon-or any black 
.,.. man-walks by, a white child calls out to his mother, "Look, a Negro! Maman, a 
Negro!" The mother reacts: "Ssh! You'll make him angry. Don't pay attention to 
him, monsieur, he doesn't realize you're just as civilized as we are."13 
It seems to the mother, in this vignette, that she is calling out the-child's rude­
ness, correcting his misplaced fears. Her reply is not openly racist, but is a white 
liberal's response: she reasons, explains, and justifies her way to acknowledging 
the humanity of the negre. Only, this reply is not so different from that of the open 
racist. Imagine, by contrast, how the mother would have reacted had her child 
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called out similarly upon encountering another white: "Look a Wh't , Mi Whit ,
,, 
Sh 1 h 
, i e. aman, a e . e wou d ave been puzzled about what the child could possibly havemeant, and would �ave_ assumed the listener to be equally puzzled rather than offended. In that situation, her 'just as civilized" explanation would not even make sense. 
�en w�ite encounters_white, Farron observes, there is no need for reasoning?ne s way mto the humamty of the other person-a justification of the human­ity of ��other human is otiose. That encounter is treated as the "base case" ofr�cogmti?n. White encountering negre-even in the case of the well-meaning!1be�al-�s a departure from that base case: it involves a request or demand for Justtfic�ti?n of t�e humanity of the other. Only, the issue of that demand itself�a�es it _ impossible for the demand to be fulfilled. As soon as person A needsJustification that person -� has �he attributes of humanity, that is exactly for A to�ndercut �utual recogmt10n-1.e., to refuse the constitutiveness of B's recogni­tion for A s own self-consciousness. 
In sh�rt: Farron argues that the division between white and negre is not a matter o� �l�ssifying �?pie accor�ng to their attributes. It is even a mistake to see the di:1�1on as an 1lhberal classification of some people as valuable and deserving ofpnvileg�, and oth�rs as flawed and deserving of servitude . Nor can it be rectifiedby the liberal proJect of equalizing resources and privileges : the division is more �<la
.
mental than that. !'he �ase �ase_ for humanity-with-no-need-for-justification is whzte. The category �egre 1s denvat1ve and set up in opposition to that base case.Rather tha� the categones white an� negre being a way to divide up humanity, the category negre undercuts the hurnamty of the individual who falls into that category.
Fanon's paradoxes
F�non is a di�?11ostician of human tragedy: he reveals the impossible and contra­dict_ory condit10n of a human denied his humanity. At the outset of Black Skin White_ Masks, Farron asks, "What does the black man want? RUillling the risk ofangenng my black brothers, I shall say that a Black is not a man ... This essay will a�temp_t to understand the Black-White relationship. The white man is locked in his whiteness. The black man in his blackness ... How can we break the cycle?"I4Over the course _of the boo�, Fano_n explains the relationship, showing throughtheor� and expenence the w1thholdmg of recognition. But he does not answer his questwn-there is �o breaking of the cycle, or, at least, no rational path to do so.The person categonzed as negre faces an unsolvable dilemma. There is nothinghe or she ca� d� t� force recognition, even (or perhaps especially) in contexts "':here the_ white ms1sts that there is no difference between the races_ is As Fanon ?1scusses m the sect�on of�he Wretched of the Earth titled "On Violence,"16 there is no way eve� to raise �e issue of colonial injustice without that being perceivedas a� act of v10lence. V10lence damages all parties, and he does not advocate it but m _a �ense violence is inevitable. Still, there is also no reason to have confi��ence 1_n its success. There is no rational or deliberative route out of a classifica­tion bmlt on impossible demands. 
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This paradoxical position for people categorized as negre is an acute prob­
lem, 'bven more so for a political activist such as Biko. However, there is also 
an even more serious philosophical problem in Fanon's diagnosis of the nature 
of the category. On Fanon's account the withholding of recognition precludes 
self-consciousness. It means that to be placed in the category negre is literally to 
inhabit a state of non-humanity, to fail to be human. This, however, seems like an 
absurd result-is it even coherent? 
One way out of the difficulty is to argue that the withholding of recognition is 
a matter of racist beliefs or ascriptions, rather than genuine withholding of rec­
ognition itself. Gordon 1993, 1995 discusses an approach along these lines. He 
explores the idea that racism involves a kind of Sartrean "bad_ faith"-a r�fusal 
to consciously acknowledge what one knows to be true. Racism, accordmg to 
Gordon, is dehumanizing; it involves the refusal to ascribe humanity to someone 
that the racist knows is human. But even the idea of "dehumanizing" someone, 
Gordon argues requires the prior acknowledgement of that person's humanity. 
Neither racism
,
as bad faith nor racism as dehumanization makes sense if recogni­
tion is withheld at the outset. This would mean that anti-black racist categories do 
not exactly involve a lack of mutual recognition; rather, they involve the �ailure 
to acknowledge that there is murual recognition. This proposal would retam the
idea that mutual recognition is constitutive of self-consciousness, but deny that 
self-consciousness has been undermined by a lack of mutual recognition. Rather, 
anti-black racism is a kind of misclassification: white involves the incorrect clas­
sification of a subset of people as being the base case of humanity, and negre the 
incorrect classification of another subset as lacking humanity. 
There is much to be said for this account, but it is not clear how compatible it 
is with Fanon's claims, including the part of Hegel that he endorses . (I do not take 
Gordon to be ascribing this view to Farron, but rather to be exploring the idea on 
its own merits.) On the "bad faith" diagnosis, racism or the withholding of explicit 
recognition amounts to making a willful mistake, falsely classifying a person in a 
category to which she does not actually belong. Only, in that cas_e,_ it i� not clear 
why this withholding should be so important in the first place. L1vmg m_a world 
pervaded by false beliefs is psychologically corrosive, perhaps even leadmg peo­
ple to the point of doubting their own humanity. But it falls far short of Fano�'s 
argument that their humanity itself is compromised. It also does not seem to hne 
up with Fanon ' s diagnosis of the racism of the liberal: after all, the erro� of the 
white liberal is the opposite, i.e., to mistakenly believe that she is respectmg her 
interlocutor as human. Nor does it yield an unsolvable dilemma: there would be a 
rational response, i.e., to correct the false beliefs. 
My aim here is not to come to resolution on the best way to read Farron, nor 
is it to solve these puzzles or to criticize Fanon's premises. Rather, I suggest t�at 
Fanon's whitelnegre distinction, and the complexities it faces, be seen as a pomt 
of departure for Biko and the white/non-white distinction that in turn is the basis 
for Biko's category black. Biko comes to the table in a different racist cont�xt and 
with urgent political aims, and armed with Fanon's approach as a compelling but 
proble�atic theoretical framework. 
104 Brian Epstein 
Biko: from deprivation of recognition to deprivation of agency 
Like Fanon, Biko regards liberalism as self-deceptive, if not openly hypocritical. 
Biko largely agrees with Fanon 's diagnosis of its failure: it does nothing to coun­
ter the withholding of the humanity of non-whites despite congratulating itself 
for its enlightened perspective. Worse, in its "enlightened" actions, it insidiously 
reinforces that withholding of humanity. 
Biko, however, diverges from Fanon with respect to what exactly is withheld. 
He is not principally concerned with the deprivation of recognition, but rather the 
deprivation of agency. The distinction between white and non-white is fundamen­
tally a distinction between those who can act and those who are deprived of the 
capacity to act. 
Biko describes the problems with liberalism in the political more than the 
interpersonal sphere. For example, one of the triggers for Biko and his peers to 
found SASO in 1968 was their experience with the putatively liberal National 
Union of South African Students (NUSAS). NUSAS at the time was the main 
student organization in South Africa, coordinating anti-apartheid activities across 
ca�puses. But though it was nominally a multiracial organization, it was run by 
white students at the leading (i.e., white) universities. 17 White domination in the 
governance of an organization supposedly aiming to counter apartheid was mani­
festly absurd to Biko. He points out that some of the behavior that exacerbated the 
disengagement of black students from NUSAS was just open racism: at the 1967 
conference, for instance, white students were housed on campus where the confer­
ence was held, while black students had to stay in a church building some distance 
away and take buses onto campus for the meetings. But Biko also discusses struc­
�al reasons ?ehind the disparity of agency in the organization. One seemingly 
mmor but tellmg factor was the fact that NUSAS, like most national organizations, 
conducted its business exclusively in English, while the "Bantu education sys­
tem" of the apartheid era was expressly designed to limit English literacy among 
African youth. 18 Working in English was necessary to have political impact in 
South Africa, but it also affected the internal dynamics in the NUSAS meetings: 
Unfortunately the books you read are in English, English is a second language 
to you; you have probably been taught in a vernacular especially during these 
days of Bantu education up to Standard 6 ... During the old days ofNUSAS 
where [white] students would be talking about something that you as a black 
man have experienced in your day to day li fe, but your powers of articulation 
are not as good as theirs ... you are forced into a subservient role of having 
to say yes to what they are saying, talking about what you have experienced, 
which they have not experienced, because you cannot express it so well. This 
in a sense inculcates also in numerous students a sense of inadequacy . 19 
This is a case in which liberalism undermines the agency it would seem aimed at 
promoting. A white liberal might intend to take action to rectify a wrong he sees 
in the world. And the liberal correctly sees that the optimal route for taking action 
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in South African society, structure
d as it is, is in E�glish and �n the r
hetorical style 
he k,arned in prep school and 
university. Thus, Ill that social �truc�u
re, he_ c
or-
ctly identifies himself as an effecti
ve actor, and conducts meet1�gs m Engl
ish �o
re 
hi hat he sees as a moral end. B
ut in doing so, the liberal seizes agenc
y. His
ac eve w l' hi posedly 
acting in a way that is instrum
entally effective for acc�mp is ng a
 sup 
moral aim is simultaneously an 
act of depriving no�-wh�tes of agen
cy•. 
For Biko as for Fanon, the liberal rea
ction to racism is self-und�rmmmg-:--b�
t 
it is self-undermining in a differ
ent way. Fanon's lib�ral r_eaction m
volves _J
usti­
fication, which itself undermines
 recognition. For B�ko, m _
contr�st, the l�beral
reaction involves the white taki
ng action--even takmg acnon wit� th
e aim of
rectifying wrongs-that itself under
mines the agency of the non-white: . 
Biko demonstrates his point in a sim
ilar way to Fanon-by descnbmg h�
ed
experience. Biko's descriptions, h
owever, include physical systems of
 oppress:on
as much as they do face-to-face in
teractions. Among the m?st p?werful
 repres�ive 
mechanisms of apartheid, for instance, was the fo
rced migrat10� of population
s
to townships. Not only were the l
ivin� conditi�ns in 
the t_o":11shi?s po�r, bu
t the 
distances alone structured and constr
amed the hves of their mhab1tants. 
the townships are placed long dis
tances away from the working a�e
as 
where black people work, and the
 transport conditions are appallm
g,
trains are overcrowded all the time
, taxis that they use �re overcrowd
ed,
the whole travelling situation is dan
gerous, and by the time a ?uy gets t
o
work he has really been through a 
mill; he gets to work, there is no pea�
e 
either at work, his boss sits on him 
to eke out of him eve� the last effor
t m
order to boost up production. This 
is the common expenence of the bl
�ck 
man. When he gets back from work
 through the �ame �roces� o
f�ravellmg
conditions, he can only take out hi
s anger on his family which is the 
last 
defence that he has.
20 
The placement of townships-just clo
se enough to commute to w�rk in th
e ci_t
ies 
but distant enough that the commute
 itself rids people �fa�� free time
 they might 
have-is a mechanism for depriving in
dividuals of their abih� to a�t. And th
at
.' 
of
course, is just one structure of constra
int. Under the aP_art�ezd regime, he p�mts 
out, non-whites are constrained to th
e point that they hve m fear even of
 act10ns
they may unwittingly have taken. 
No average black man can ever at a
ny moment be a?solutcl? sure that 
he is
not breaking a law. There are so man
y laws governing the (ives and beh
av­
iour of black people that sometime
s one feels that the pohce only nee
d_ 
to
page at random through their statute 
book to be able to get a law under wh
ich 
to charge a victim.
21 
In short, the sort of dehumanization B
iko describes is not so_ 
much a �ailure t� be 
· d ·t · a km· d of imprisonment-
an overwhelmmg set of constramts
recogmze as i is 
that determine action. 
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. As i�lustrated by the sense of inadequacy of the non-white students in NUSASdiscuss10n�, this deprivation of agency has psychological consequences, whichfeed ba�k mto the loss of agency. This idea had already been in circulation fora long time a�ong Sout.h Afric�n th�orists. In his 1946 "Policy of the CongressYouth League -an Afncan nat10nabst youth movement in South Africa-AntonLembede writes: 
Mo
.ral and spiritual degeneration manifests itself in such abnormal and patho­logical ph�nomena as loss of self-confidence, inferiority complex, a feeling?f frust:at10n, the worship and idolisation of white men, foreign leaders andideologies. All these are symptoms of a pathological state of mind. 22 
Biko a�ees,_ but here too he connects it with the material conditions in whichnon-whites hve: 
T�e bla�k man in �imself has developed a certain sense of alienation, hereJects hnnself, precisely because he attaches the meaning white to all that isgood . •. The homes are different, the streets are different, the lighting is dif­ferent, _so you tend to begin to feel that there is something incomplete in yourhumamty, and that completeness goes with whiteness . This is carried throughto adulthood when the black man has got to live and work.23 
Such psychological effects are, according to Biko, central to the mechanisms ofcontrol of the apartheid system: 
• .. the most potent weapon in the hands of the oppressor is the mind of the oppressed. Once the latter has been so effectively manipulated and controlledby the _oppressor so as to make the oppressed believe that he is a liability tothe white man, then there will be nothing the oppressed can do that will reallyscare the powerful masters.24 
Still, for Biko the psychology is only one aspect of the mechanism of control. It isa part of the larger structure, in which the agency of non-whites is blocked.
Non-white and the inclusiveness of Biko's categories
Bik? �grees with Lembede in diagnosing psychological pathologies as a productof hvi�g und.er. 
apartheid. But he and the other Black Consciousness thinkers break m a s�king w�y w�th a more central feature of the approach of Lembedean� other African nat10nahsts. Lembede places the solidarity of a unified Africannation at the center of his policy statement: 
Afric� is a ?lackma�'s co�try: Africans are the natives of Africa and theyhave inhabited Africa, their Motherland, from time immemorial; Africabelongs to them . .. 
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Cooperation between Africans and other Non-Europeans on common 
problems and issues may be highly desirable. But this occasional coopera­
tion can only take place between Africans as a single unit and other Non­
European groups as separate units. Non-European unity is a fantastic dream 
which has no foundation in reality.25 
Black Consciousness thinkers explicitly reject this: the categories non-white and 
black cut across the different racial categories of apartheid. At the same time, 
they also reject the view that had hitherto been regarded as its main alternative-a 
non-racial, post-racial, or multi-racial vision of a liberal society, as defended in 
particular by the African National Congress.26 Rather, they insist on exactly ':h�t 
Lembede rejects as having "no foundation in reality": that the fundamental unit m 
opposition to apartheid is non-Europeans. 
To be sure there is obvious political value in unifying the oppressed m oppo­
sition to apa:theid. A well-worn tactic of colonial powers had been to pit local 
populations against one another in order to relieve pressure on themselves, and 
the apartheid government was well-practiced in that skill. The editorial of the 
SASO newsletter of September 1970 made this point explicitly: 
Placed in context therefore, the "black consciousness" attitude seeks to define 
one's enemy more clearly and to broaden the base from which we are operat­
ing. It is a deliberate attempt by all of us to counteract the "divide and rule" 
attitude of the evil-doers.27 
Yet political expediency hardly suffices to explain their approach. It is one thing 
to form alliances between groups, and another to propose that the fundamental 
category that defines a movement does not break down along racial lines. A dif­
ferent passage in the same editorial expresses the foundations for the movement's 
treatment of "black": 
The essence of what I am saying is that the term "black" must be seen in its 
right context. No new category is being created but a "re-Christening" is t�­
ing place. We are merely refusing to be regarded as non-persons and claim 
the right to be called positively. No one group is exclusively black.28 
This builds directly on Fanon's strategy. Biko recognizes the apartheid authori­
ties as having chosen an uncannily accurate term-"non-white"-for their signs. 
Unlike the terms "native" or "Bantu," the term "non-white" openly displays 
that it is a contrastive term, one that marks a category in opposition to the base 
case. This term also makes it clear----even more than is apparent with a term 
like "native" or "negre"-that the category it denotes is part of an interdefined 
pair, white/non-white. 
In the last section, I stressed one important point of difference between Biko 
and Fanon. Rather than a lack of recognition, Biko focuses on a lack of agency 
at the heart of apartheid. This difference, however, is tied to another equally 
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impor:tant one. I� Fanon, _the !�ck ofrecognition is associated with the singularityof anti-blac� racism. While Biko draws on Fanon's insight, this singularity is notthe foundation on w�ch h� buil� his di�gnosis or categorization. In identifyingt�e category non-white as involving a withholding of agency, Biko identifies a different group as the one whose agency has been withheld: all those whom the apartheid authorities categorize as non-white. 
�ik�'s aim in introducing the category black is to break out of the whitelnon­"!hrte dichotomy, replacing the category non-white with one that is neither deriva­tive nor negative. In hi� agenc�-centered understanding of that dichotomy, I will
�uggest, he �lr�ady av01ds the internal paradox that arises for Fanon. But his more important aim 1� to solve Fanon 's problem of action or remediation: in generatinga c�tegory that 1s not the negation of a "base case," he is also able to show what actions are to be taken. 
Fundamentality and negativity in categories
�n fo�al logi.c, negation operates at the level of sentences or formulas: to say1:he wmd.ow 1s not opaque" is to deny the proposition that the window is opaque.It is not to introduce a new property, not-opaque, and apply that to the window. To ?e sw:e,_ we can make sense of the property not-opaque should we want to-but if so, It 1s b�st unders�oo� as a complement rather than a negation. That is, given some domain of apphcat10n (such as the set of windows or the set of objects in general), opaque and not-opaque divide the domain in two. That does not make not-opaq.ue a negatio�: just as not-opaque is the complement of opaque, not-not­?paque (1.e., opaque) 1s the complement of not-opaque. This point is even clearerif we call the two categories "opaque" and "transparent." If opaque is the same as not-transparent, and transparent is the same as not-opaque, then which is sup­po�,
ed to ?e the negative one? It makes no sense to regard one of these categories as negative" or "a negation." 
How, then, are we to understand the "negativity" of negre and of non-white?When �ano� reveals th?t ne[!re should be understood as a negative category, heclearly 1s doing something different than dividing humanity into two groups. As we have note�, the cate�ori�s white and negre are not even complements, since even on a racist �ategonzation many people fall into neither one nor the other.Moreo�er, even if they were, their complementarity would fail to capture the ontological asymmetry between white and negre. Negre is not just a different category from w!1ite, but on� that_ is ontologically derivative or subsidiary. Recent work in metaphysics gives us tools for exploring the idea that one cate­go� may be more "fundamental" than another. We can extend this to help clarifythe I�ea that one category may be a "base case" and another a kind of derivative negation of the first. 
Ca�egories ��d P�?perties are often analyzed in terms of the "necessary andsufficient con?itions for an object to be a member of a category or to possess a proper�y. F.or instance, an object has the property being a bachelor if and only ifthat obJect 1s a man and is also unmarried. To many philosophers, giving necessary 
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and sufficient conditions has seemed to be the way to give a full accounting of 
the nature of a category. One problem with this (noted as far back as Plato's 
Euthyphro) is the symmetry between the defining properties and the defined_prop­
erties. With only necessary and sufficient conditions, there would be nothing to 
stop us from analyzing the category unmarried man in terms of bachelor, rath�r 
than the other way around. Yet it seems that these two are not exactly symmetn­
cal: it seems that the property being a bachelor is "built out of' being unmarried 
and being a man. That is, bachelor seems less "fundamental" than unmarried and 
man, and for that matter unmarried seems less fundamental than married. 
One kind of fundamentality that metaphysicians have begun to explore regards 
certain/acts being more fundamental than other facts.29 The fact that John is a 
bachelor for instance obtains because John is an unmarried man. In contrast, the ' ' · 
· b h 1 30 fact that John is an unmarried man does not obtain because John 1s a ac e or. 
A less-explored but more pertinent kind of fundamentality has to do with the 
social construction of categories. An inquiry into social construction asks: What 
explains the fact that bachelor is a social category? What facts about the world 
and about our society set up bachelor to be one of our social categories? These 
are questions about a different kind of metaphysical explanation. In co_ntrast to 
the questions, What are the contours of X? What conditions does an ob;ect n�ed
to satisfy in order to fall into category X?, the inquiry into social construct10n 
asks, In virtue of what is category X carved out to have the contours it does '.31 
A second and different kind of fundamentality, then, arises in the context of social 
construction: new categories are not socially constructed out of the blue, but make 
use of old existing categories. One category is more fundamental than another 
category, in this sense, if facts about the first are involved in socially constructing 
the second. 
These two kinds of fundamentality-in the building blocks of social facts and 
in the construction of social categories-open the door to several ways that cat­
egories can be negations or oppositional. A useful way to understand the fun­
damentality of white with respect to negre, as well as negre being a negative or 
oppositional category, is as a matter of how they are respectively sociall� con­
structed. Likewise for the fundamentality of white with respect to non-white and 
the negativity of non-white. 
To see this it is useful to elaborate a bit on how the categories white and negre 
are socially constructed following Fanon's approach, and white and non-w�ite 
following Biko 's. We can see Fanon's account as involving a sequence of denva­
tive constructions, starting with the category human, then setting up the category 
white as appropriating that preceding category, and then building the category 
negre in opposition to white. For each of these categories, we can profile the facts 
that generate or socially construct them. As I described earlier, Fanon draws on 
Hegel's account of the construction of human (or of self-conscious): the fact� !hat 
generate this category include the processes of struggle and mutual recogmt10n. 
This constructed category human carries along with it a variety of norms and 
default ways its members are to be treated. Members immediately bel�ng. to t�e 
community and are recognized by default. The constructed category white 1s built 
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atop the category human: white is set up by attitudes, practices, and structures in 
which people with white skin are treated according to those norms and defaults. 
For Fanon, the category negre is constructed by more than just the practices 
and structures by which whites appropriate the category human. The singularity 
of anti-black racism involves not just a contrast, but a denial or rejection of the 
applicability of the norms and defaults that accompany humanity specifically to 
people with black skin. The denial or negativity in the construction of the category 
negre consists in specifically counteracting-through attitudes and face-to-face 
interactions-the norms and defaults of humanity that white is set up to have. 
In some ways the case ofBiko's non-white is clearer: the withholding ofagency 
by structures of apartheid is less abstract than the face-to-face withholding ofrec­
ognition. At the same time, however, it is easier in the case of Biko's non-white 
to be misled with regard to the sort of "negativity" or "negation" involved in 
it. Unlike Fanon's categories, the South African categories white and non-white 
are complements in the logical sense: they apportion all people into those two 
categories without overlap. This risks obscuring the point that Biko's treatment 
of the opposition of these two categories is much like Fanon's: in particular, non­
white is derivative with regard to white, and it is socially constructed as negative 
in a similar way. It is true that white and non-white have complementary exten­
sions, but this is not the main way in which non-white is a derivative and nega­
tive category. 
Casting Biko's approach in a similar sequence, the apartheid category white 
is constructed with the aim of appropriating agency, i.e., the category to which 
individuals who act freely in the world, subject to ordinary constraints, belong. 
Agent, in the base case, is set up by practices and social structures in which indi­
viduals understand themselves to act, exercise their own capacities, and accom­
modate others in their exercise of theirs. Even in struggling against one another, 
agents understand the agency of others and treat them as such. Connected to this 
are norms as to how it is rational to act in order to get things accomplished in the 
world. The category white, then, is set up in such a way as to appropriate agency 
entirely on behalf of a particular group of people, where the mutual norms asso­
ciated with agency apply to and only to whites. In apartheid it is clear how this 
is done: social, legal, and physical structures and practices are put in place so 
that whites exclusively have the capacities of agents and are subject to the norms 
of agency. 
The construction of the category non-white is derivative. Facts about white­
that there is such a constructed category, that certain people are marked out as 
belonging to it, that it is constructed so as to be associated by default with the 
norms and powers of agents-figure into the construction of non-white. Other 
features of apartheid society also figure into the construction of the category non­
white, such as structural impediments to the exercise of agency, laws, business 
structures, educational institutions, geographic placement of populations, and 
transportation systems. And psychological facts also figure into the construc­
tion of non-white: the alienation and sense of incapacity that are generated by 
the structural constraints feed back into the construction of a category in which 
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agency is undercut. Together these construct non-white as a category that coun­
ter-acts the potential of non-whites to exercise agency. 
In describing both Fanon's and Biko's accounts of social construction, I have 
left one important aspect of the social construction of the category white to the 
side: namely, the reciprocal derivativeness of white on negre or on non-white. 
Even if white is constructed to be the "base case," it is not yet a racialized cat­
egory, nor is it salient that it is marked, until it is set up in confrontation with the 
"derivative case." Moreover, the facts that figure into the social construction of 
white are affected reciprocally by the social construction of negre and non-white. 
Thus it is a simplification to regard white as strictly fundamental and negre and 
non-white as strictly derivative. Still, it would be a bigger distortion to empha­
size the interdefinition of the categories in Fanon and Biko. Fanon is explicitly 
rejecting the prevailing interpretation of the master-slave relationship in which 
the two involve genuine reciprocity. Rather, he diagnoses anti-black racism as 
fundamentally asymmetric. Likewise, Biko regards white apartheid society as 
making use of non-white labor to its advantage, but the fact that whites are able 
to exercise agency is not explained to a significant degree in terms of a story of 
reciprocal definition. Even though the apartheid category white is to some extent 
constructed by its opposition to the category non-white, that is not a central part 
of the account. Even more importantly, Biko in particular does not much concern 
himself with a diagnosis or definition of the category white. His concern is the 
replacement of the white/non-white field of categories with a different one. 
Biko's category black
The inclusiveness of Biko's category black is one of its most striking charac­
teristics. Some theorists have gone so far as to argue that even whites can be 
black in Biko's sense-Xolela Mangcu, for instance, proposes that whites who 
"pass" as black, or who are born into black communities, fit Biko's definition.32 
But though this interpretation comports with Biko's rejection of traditional racial 
lines in the category, the definition explicitly rules this out: the category applies 
to those who are discriminated against by law or tradition.33 More importantly, 
to broaden Biko's definition conflicts with his central philosophical move. The 
transformation from non-white to black does not change the extension of the cat­
egory, i.e., the people to whom the category applies. Rather, that transformation 
is precisely designed to preserve that extension. This is the sense in which, as the 
SASO editorial clarified, "no new category is being created but a 're-Christening' 
is taking place. We are merely refusing to be regarded as non-persons and claim 
the right to be called positively. No one group is exclusively black." The category 
black does not divide off certain people from the category non-white according to 
the color of their skin, or according to the African-ness of their ancestry, or even 
according to their attitudes. 
How can the category black have the same extension as non-white-i.e., have 
the exact same people who fall into one category fall into another-and yet be 
an importantly different category? And how can we square this idea with Biko's 
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characterization of black as involving radically different psychological attitudes 
than does non-white? 
Biko sets up black as a non-derivative category. It is not a counterpart or nega­
tion of a prior category of whiteness, which was set up as having the powers of 
agency by default. But he also recognizes that it makes no sense to construct 
an idealized category out of thm air, pretending that race-based structures of 
oppression do not exist and that all we need to do is adopt a hopeful non-racial 
humanism. Like non-white, the category black is historically and geographically 
situated. It is partly constructed by the apartheid impediments to the exercise of 
agency-laws, geography, etc. 
Considering the actual impediments to agency in the context, we see that they 
apply exactly to those people that apartheid defines as non-white. This explains 
why the extension of the category black is the same as the extension of non-white. 
The extension of black is complementary to that of white because social structures 
and existing conditions are drawn-in the real-world apartheid context-along 
the lines of white/non-white. These actual conditions and structures in society, as 
well as the history of discrimination, figure into carving out the category black to 
have the extension it does. 
Still, carving out the category black in part on the basis of structures of oppres­
sion is different than carving it out as a derivative category to white. Given that 
they are both socially constructed by the apartheid context, black and non-white 
are closely related to one another. But they are not constructed by all the same 
facts, or in the same way as one another. 
In the construction of black as distinct from non-white, the psychological facts 
do make a cmcial difference, and we need to disentangle several roles that psy­
chological facts play in Biko's account. The two sets of psychological states Biko 
mentions are the alienation, self-doubt, and sense of lack of agency associated 
with living under the apartheid system (what I will call the "negative states") and 
the feeling of defiance and sense of agency in the struggle against apartheid (the 
"positive states"). 
The negative states are involved in two feedback mechanisms: they are caused 
by the structures of apartheid and reinforce those structures, and they also causally 
reinforce themselves. The negative states are also involved in the construction 
of the category non-white: they are part of what sets non-white up as the non­
agentive counterpart to white. 
Putting forward an analysis of non-white as Biko does also has psychological 
consequences. Making people aware of the category non-white is jarring and-it 
must be acknowledged-potentially even hurtful to the people oppressed in the 
apartheid system. When a person applies the term "non-white" to him- or herself, 
it indicates acquiescence or even complicity with the apartheid categorization of 
humanity. Yet people had no choice but to classify themselves as such. Dozens 
of times a day, in the course of ordinary activities, one would have had to follow 
the signage and classify oneself as non-white. Under pain of violence, it would 
have been impossible to avoid this repeated selt:classification. Accepting Biko's 
definition means being in a continual state of self-reproach. 
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Biko was not of course suggesting that individuals had the power on their own 
to igne,re apartheid restrictions or that they should pointlessly suffer apartheid 
violence, only to be forced to conform anyway. He was, however, suggesting that 
this sort of self-reproach was different from the negative psychology that leads 
to acquiescence. Recognizing the inappropriateness of this self-classification is 
already to take on a kind of agency. Biko treats the attitude of defiance not only as 
the appropriate response to this enforced self-classification, but also as the likely 
outcome of being made aware of it. 
The positive psychological states, then, are in part caused by awareness of the 
negative states and their role in the construction of the category non-white. The 
positive states are part of what sets up the category black, and here too there is a 
feedback mechanism: awareness of the character of the category black reinforces 
the positive states. The positive states, in tum, have causal consequences: they 
lead to action that challenges apartheid structures, and also counteract the nega­
tive states, which diminishes the extent to which those states buttress apartheid. If 
Biko is correct to claim that "the most potent weapon in the hands of the oppres­
sor is the mind of the oppressed," then it is plausible to hypothesize that provok­
ing a changed psychological response-first the response of being aware of the 
repeated self-classification into the apartheid category, second the response of 
defiance-is a potent counter-weapon in the hands of the oppressed. 
Earlier I stressed Biko's discussion of practical constraints as central to the 
deprivation of agency under apartheid. It is not just psychological facts, but mate­
rial ones, that set up the category white as having the powers and norms of agency 
by default, and that deprive the category non-white of those powers and norms. 
Biko's approach does put significant weight on a changed psychology as setting 
up a category that overturns these norms and powers. In this he is influenced­
perhaps too much-by Sartre's confidence in the ability of individual choice to 
affect the nature of the individual. But it is also possible to see Biko as putting 
forward a causal hypothesis: that changes in attitudes are likely to cascade into 
changed actions and changed structures, so that while they do not immediately 
lead to the elimination of structures of oppression, they do at least lead to the 
genuine exercise of agency even in the face of that oppression. 
The category black remains problematic: like non-white, it is set up in part by 
the oppressive structures of the apartheid context, and would not be a category 
at all without that history and background. Yet, even while acknowledging that 
context, it aims to strip away from non-white the deprivation of agency which is 
itself largely a product of those structures. 
Biko's analysis also circumvents the two difficulties that Fanon faces. The 
paradox in Fanon's analysis arises from humans having their humanity with­
held. There is nothing inherently paradoxical, on the other hand, about the idea 
in Biko that people can be agents and yet be fully deprived of their capacity 
to act. Likewise, Biko's approach provides a clearer route to changing this 
situation, and rectifying the deprivation of agency. Fanon's analysis left little 
room for rational improvements to oppressive structures of mutual recognition. 
Changing a near-complete deprivation of agency-as Biko advocates-may 
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require radical changes in structures and attitudes, but it is clearer what 
changes can serve this aim. Even psychological changes alone hold promise 
in this regard. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have argued that Biko makes two philosophical innovations in 
his definitions: first, the shift from analyzing the negative counterpart to white in 
terms of the withholding of recognition to an analysis in terms of the deprivation 
of agency; and second, the construction of an improved category, one that is nei­
ther derivative nor negative (in the senses I have tried to clarify). 
I want to emphasize the significance of this second innovation. The critique 
of concepts and socially constructed categories has been central to philosophical 
inquiry since at least the middle of the nineteenth century. Marx and Nietzsche 
in particular are associated with the "hermeneutics of suspicion"-removing 
the veneer of naturalness or goodness associated with commonplace social cat­
egories and revealing their oppressive cores. Fanon's work on the phenomenol­
ogy of Negritude can be seen in part as a brilliant contribution to this tradition. 
A continual difficulty with work along these lines, however, is the next move, 
subsequent to the critique. There is a temptation simply to erase or dispose of a 
problematic category, without taking a practical look at the plausibility and con­
sequences of such an erasure. Or instead to propose a utopian set of categories 
that do not reflect the structural conditions on the ground. Or else to retreat to an 
earlier--often idealized-historical scheme. None of these are options for Biko: 
if his philosophical work is to have any practical use at all, he needs to replace the 
apartheid field of categories with one that is an ethical improvement, aspirational 
without being unrealistic, and sensitive to existing conditions. 
Magaziner (2010:42) comments that Biko at times appears to forget Fanon's 
critique of Sartre, and instead to agree with Sartre's characterization of Negritude 
as the "weak term" in a dialectical process that leads to a non-racial future.34 It is 
surely right to observe that Sartre's narrative is distasteful and overly teleological. 
Still, it is reasonable for Biko to remain uncommitted to a vision of exactly how 
things will play out in the long term, especially if structures of oppression can be 
overcome. It is not just unproductive, but counterproductive, to insist on a nar­
rative that predicts and imposes an ultimate or eventual set of social categories. 
To do so would force the first step-the amelioration of an existing category-to 
conform to a fanciful narrative about the future. Will structures of oppression 
be completely eliminated? Will racial categories become irrelevant, and would 
that be an improvement? Hard to say in the long term, but in the short term it 
would be foolish to pretend that structures of oppression are not carved into the 
geography of the nation. For Biko, the category black does not need to be con­
structed as a component of some ultimate or final scheme, nor as a stepping stone 
to some other scheme he aims at. Instead, it is an improvement, a replacement of 
an oppressive set of categories by a better one, as one element of a set of actions 
to take against South African apartheid.35 
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Notes 
1 Biko 2004 ([ 1978], p. 52). 
2 See, for instance, More (2008, 2014); Gordon (2008). 
' 3 Hull (2016). 
4 These colleges, instituted by the Extension of University Education Act of 1959, were 
Ngoye, Tmfloop, Fort Hare (which had previously been somewhat open), Bellville, and 
Durban Westville. See Lapping (1986). 
5 See for instance the Tomlinson Commission report (Tomlinson 1955), Dubow (1995). 
6 Horrell (1958). 
7 More (2014, pp. 174---5) discusses the appropriation of the term "black" by BCM theo­
rists, in parallel to the re-appropriation of the term "negre" by Negritude theorists in 
France (cf. Cesaire 1972 [1955], p. 74). Biko discusses the choice and connotat10ns of 
the word "black" for BCM in his testimony in the BPC (Black People's Convention)­
SASO trial of 1976 (see Biko 2004 [1978], pp. 114---18). 
8 I am grateful to George Hull and Danwood Chirwa for discussion of this point. 
9 Haslanger (2000, 2014). 
10 Fanon (2008 [1952], p. 192). 
11 This was largely due to the work of Kojeve and Hyppolite. 
12 Fanon (2008 [1952], p. 195 n. I 0). 
13 Fanon (2008 [I 952], p. 93). 
14 Fanon (2008 [1952], pp. xii-xiv). 
15 Fanon (2008 [1952], p. 196). 
16 Fanon (2004 [1961]). 
17 Preceding the Extension of University Education Act of 1959, the Afrikaans-1':11gu�ge 
universities were already limited to white students, as was Rhodes Umverstty. 
Witwatersrand, UCT, and Natal, however, had been somewhat open in their admission. 
The 1959 Act ended that practice. 
18 The Bantu Education Act of 1953 shuttered nearly all mission schools, which had edu­
cated the vast majority of the black population in South Africa, replacing them with 
segregated schools funded by a limited tax base and staffed by teachers who had not 
themselves f inished high school. 
19 Biko testimony in May 1976 SASO-BPC trial (Biko 2004 [1978], p. 119). 
20 Biko (2004 [1978], p. 112). 
21 Biko (2004 [1978], p. 83). 
22 Lembede (1946); see also Patton (1986). 
23 Biko (2004 [1978], p. 111). 
24 Biko (2004 [1978], p. 74). 
25 Lembede (1946). 
26 There is some evidence that Biko regarded Black Consciousness to be the "true liberal­
ism," eventually attaining a fully integrated non-racial synthesis (Cf. Magaziner 2010, 
p. 42).
27 SASO (September 1970, p. 2). 
28 SASO (September 1970, p. 2). 
29 In the recent literature, this is often treated using the "grounding" relation. (See Rosen 
201 O; Fine 2012.) 
30 In speaking of "because," it is critical to note that some becauses and explanations are 
metaphysical, and some are causal. The fact John is an unmarried man does not cause 
John to be a bachelor. The word "because" in the above paragraph indicates a meta­
physical connection-a connection between the nature of bachelorhood and the nature 
of unmarried-man-hood-not a causal one. Contrast this with the sentence "John is a 
bachelor because he made a firm decision never to get married.'' In that sentence, the 
word "because" indicates a causal explanation. 
31 I discuss this distinction in Epstein (2015, 2016). 
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32 Xolela Mangcu (City Press, 5-Jul- 2015). 
33 Exactly how this point goes may actually depend on which South African laws we con­
sider,_ �s t�ey do not all �efine the legal categories equivalently. The "general acceptance" c?�dition '.? the _Po��lat10n Reg1str�tion Act of I �50, for instance, might rule out the pos­s1b1hty of passmg. The overall pomt, however, 1s that while Biko rules out skin color as 
a criterion for blackness, it nonetheless enters the definition by the inclusion of discrimi­
nation according to the law, which is at least in part done on the basis of skin color. 
34 Sartre (1948). 
35 I w:1 grateful to G_eorg� Hull for extensive discussion and for stimulating many ofthe ideas explored_ m this chapter. I �!so am grateful to audiences at the University ofCape Town, especially Danwood Ch1rwa, Bernhard Weiss, and Josh Davis and at the 
University of Oslo. ' 
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